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Abstract
1
 
 
Since 1990 the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has increased very rapidly. 
This paper aims to contribute to this literature by presenting a new database on PTAs called 
Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA). We identified a total of 690 negotiated trade 
agreements between 1945 and 2009 of which we have coded 404 agreements for which treaty 
texts and appendices were available. We aim to have a database for about 550 agreements by 
2012. We have coded agreements for a total of 10 broad sectors of cooperation, encompassing 
market access, services, investments, intellectual property rights, competition, public 
procurement, standards, trade remedies, non-trade issues, and dispute settlement. For each of 
these sectors, we have coded a significant number of items, meaning that we have about 100 
data points for each agreement.  The resulting DESTA database is – to the best of our 
knowledge – by far the most complete in terms of agreements and sectors covered. This 
dataset fills a crucial gap in the field by providing a fine-grain measurement of the design of 
PTAs. Among others, we think that DESTA will be of relevance for the literatures on the 
signing of PTAs; the legalization of international relations; the rational design of international 
institutions; the diffusion of policies; the political and economic effects of trade agreements; 
power relations between states; and forum shopping in international politics.  This working 
paper describes the DESTA data set and provides selected descriptive statistics. The overview 
puts emphasis on variation in design over time and across regions.  
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Introduction 
 
During the past twenty years, PTAs that liberalize trade between countries have proliferated. 
Twenty new agreements were notified to the WTO in 2009 and thirteen in 2010. Every 
member of the WTO (with the exception of Mongolia) is now a member of a PTA.
2
 The 
proliferation of PTAs shows no signs of slowing down in the near future. Many negotiations 
are underway. Canada, for instance, is currently negotiating 12 PTAs.
3
 The proliferation of 
PTAs also is not limited to developed economies. On the contrary, many PTAs are concluded 
between developing countries. The average African country belongs to four different 
agreements, and the average Latin America country belongs to seven agreements. This 
proliferation of PTAs has significantly altered the world trade regulatory landscape. Both 
economic and political studies therefore have tried to identify the factors that explain this 
rapid growth. 
 While research on PTAs is not short of theoretical arguments, there are still important 
gaps in the collection of systematic data for the purpose of empirical testing. The objective of 
this paper is to describe a new dataset on PTAs that will allow us to address a number of 
empirical puzzles present in the literature on international cooperation and the design of 
international agreements. In particular, the data could prove helpful to address research 
questions on the formation of PTAs, the design of international agreements, and the impact of 
PTAs on economic and political phenomena.  
 We have (so far) coded 404 agreements signed between 1945 and 2009. We have 
coded these agreements for a total of 10 broad sectors of cooperation ranging from market 
access to investments, services, intellectual property rights, competition, and dispute 
settlement. Some of these sectors are divided into sub-sectors. We have used manual content 
analysis and statistical techniques in order to check coders‟ reliability. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no other dataset that covers such a wide number of PTAs and that codes 
such an extensive number of sectors. 
 The next section of this paper surveys previous attempts at coding PTAs. The third 
section then outlines key scholarly debates that our data speak to. In the fourth section, we 
map the population of PTAs since 1945. Section five then describes the coding scheme and 
provides some graphical illustrations for selected factors coded. The final section provides 
                                                 
2
 Soon all WTO members will participate in new regionalism as Mongolia is currently studying the feasibility of 
a PTA with Japan and other states. 
3
 From the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada website: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx.  
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some information as to planning and process of coding and focuses on the reliability of our 
exercise.  
 
Previous attempts at mapping PTA design 
 
In political science, precedents of coding legal and political texts abound. Without the 
ambition of providing a complete list, we identify four large coding projects that are 
tangential to our work. First, there are several important attempts to measure ideological 
position of parties by coding their manifestos. These attempts are implemented by using both 
manual coding (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) and software (Benoit and Laver 
2006; Slapin and Proksch 2008; Lowe et al. 2011). Second, in the 1990s several competing 
studies have tried to come up with a reliable measure of central bank independence (Alesina 
1988, 1989; Grilli et al. 1991; Eijffinger and Schaling 1992, 1993; Cukierman et al. 1994). 
Third, Elkins et al. (2009) have manually coded all the constitutions signed between 1789 and 
now.
4
 Finally, Koremenos (2005, 2007) codes a large number of international treaties looking 
at 375 provisions. This impressive study was carried out using manual coding. In sum, these 
previous exercises have sharpened the discipline‟s attention to questions of reliability and 
show the importance of gathering data from legal and political texts. 
 PTA coding is far from new. There exist several studies that have coded (parts of) 
PTAs. These previous studies have not only helped us draw up our coding scheme, but also 
allow us to check the reliability and validity of our results. The most comprehensive attempt 
so far is Estevadeordal et al. (2009). The contributors to that volume coded around 50 
agreements, with some variation across chapters. Many studies either limit themselves to a 
small number of agreements (often from one region or signed by a few actors) or to a specific 
sector. Table 1 provides an overview of a number of coding exercises. 
                                                 
4
 http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/index.htm.  
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Table 1: Previous research on the contents of PTAs 
Study Agreements coded Sectors coded Level of detail 
Estevadeordal et al. 2009 Around 50 PTAs, with some 
variation across chapters 
Market access, trade 
remedies, technical barriers 
to trade, services, 
investments, competition 
Very detailed. For example, 
the coding of investment 
provisions comprises a total 
of 30 items 
Estevadeordal & Suominen 
2007 
12,247 international 
agreement (including PTAs 
and BITs) 
 23 domains under seven 
broad categories 
Fink & Molinuevo 2008 25 East Asian agreements 
with a services component 
Services 154 services subsectors 
across four modes of supply 
Haftel 2010 25 agreements Scope, implementation, 
institutional independence, 
corporate bureaucracy, 
dispute settlement, regional 
institutionalization 
Indicator that ranges 
between 0 and 30 
Heydon & Woolcock 2009 Series of agreements signed 
by the US, EU, EFTA, Japan 
and Singapore 
All sectors Differs, qualitative summary 
Hicks & Kim 2009 57 agreements in Asia Type, coverage (industry, 
agriculture, nontariff 
barriers, technical barriers to 
trade), dispute settlement, 
pace of liberalization 
Considerable, especially for 
dispute settlement and pace 
of liberalization 
Horn et al. 2009 28 EU and US agreements Comprehensive Presence or absence of 
substantive provisions on 
broad areas 
Houde et al. 2007 20 deep agreements Investments and services Detailed 
Kim 2010 8 US bilateral trade 
agreements 
Market access Breadth, depth, and rate of 
trade liberalization 
Kono & Rickard 2010 All agreements notified to 
the WTO 
Procurement Presence or absence of 
substantive procurement 
provisions 
Kucik 2011 330 agreements (1960-2005) Trade remedies Measures of flexibility in 
antidumping, countervailing 
duties and safeguards 
Lesher & Miroudot 2006  24 North-South agreements Investments 25 investment provisions 
Mansfield and Milner 2010 389 PTAs (1945-2005) Investment clauses and 
dispute settlement 
Ordinal indicator 
Mattoo & Sauvé 2007 App. 45 agreements Services MFN clause, national 
treatment, market access, 
coverage etc. 
McCall Smith 2000 62 trade agreements signed 
between 1957 and 1995 
Dispute settlement Along a scale with five 
values 
OECD 2002 App. 30, but varies across 
chapters 
Comprehensive Detailed with respect to 
services, qualitative 
discussion for most other 
sectors 
Roy et al. 2007 (and 
Marchetti & Roy 2009)5 
32 agreements with services 
provisions 
Services Around 150 subsectors 
across 2 modes of supply 
UN Social and Economic 
Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific (2005-2010) 
137 Asian and Pacific trade 
agreements (including 
framework agreements) 
Comprehensive Presence or absence of 
major provisions 
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 Some of the data are available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/dataset_e/dataset_e.htm.  
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The theoretical backdrop to the project 
 
The motivation to collect this data has been our belief that many strands of literature in 
political science or economics would benefit from better data on the design of international 
trade agreements. Among others, we think that our data will be of relevance for the following 
bodies of literature: 
 
The signing of PTAs 
There is no shortage of explanations on why countries form PTAs. Regarding the economic 
literature, the domino theory (Baldwin 1993) explains the proliferation of PTAs using a 
political economy model that focuses on the cost - in terms of trade diversion - of being 
excluded from PTAs. Furthermore, a more recent study emphasizes the role of economic size 
and similarity among economies as important drivers in the formation of PTAs (Baier and 
Bergstrand 2004). As regards the political science literature, there exist many different 
explanations for why states sign PTAs, suggesting that states might aim to lock-in domestic 
reforms, strengthen their position in multilateral negotiations, pursue import-substitution 
policies at the regional level, address security concerns, or sign PTAs as a reaction to other 
agreements (for an overview, see Ravenhill 2008). Recent studies investigate the role of 
domestic institutions (Mansfield et al. 2002; 2008; Baccini 2011), interest groups (Mattli 
1999; Chase 2005; Dür 2007), bureaucratic interests (Elsig 2007, Elsig and Dupont 2011) and 
international shocks (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003) in explaining the formation of PTAs. 
The political science literature thus has the merit of showing that politics do matter in a state‟s 
decision to establish a PTA. A major shortcoming of most previous research, however, has 
been the failure to take account of important design variation across PTAs. Our dataset aims 
to fill this gap in the field. For instance, it will provide the data to facilitate the further 
exploration of what impact domestic institutions have upon the design of PTAs – in terms of 
flexibility, for instance - and how interest groups‟ preferences affect the inclusion of specific 
provisions in PTA treaties. 
 
Legalization through international agreements 
A growing body of literature has addressed the issue of legalization or judicialization 
describing the range and variability of institutional forms in interstate relations (Stone Sweet 
1999, Abbott et al. 2000). This strand of literature reflects the actual move in international 
cooperation towards embracing more detailed and precise rules (degree of precision), 
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accepting more stringent commitments as well as compliance mechanisms (degree of 
obligation), and agreeing on additional forms of rule enforcement (e.g., delegation to 
international organizations and international courts). Some of the WTO agreements (e.g., the 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement) have served as prime examples of 
highly legalized treaties (Abbott et al. 2000). More recently, legalization has been studied as 
an explanatory variable analyzing how certain elements of legalization affect domestic 
policies (Allee 2005) or compliance more generally (Guzman 2008, Zangl 2008). As regards 
PTAs some work has been carried out on dispute settlement provisions (e.g., McCall Smith 
2000). Yet, only little systematic research has been conducted on the variance in legalization 
across PTAs and the dominating approaches to judicial forum choice.  
 
The rational design of international institutions/agreements 
Another research program that has emerged alongside legalization is the rational design 
literature. A number of liberal scholars have postulated that design differences across 
international agreements and/or institutions are not random and can not be explained by 
simply drawing on realist arguments (Koremenos et al. 2001). The original contribution of the 
rational design (RD) literature has been to conjecture a number of explanations to account for 
particular design features of institutions and/or agreements (e.g., membership rules, scope of 
issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of 
arrangements). Key explanations in the RD tradition are drawn from game theory, in 
particular cooperation problems that are characterized by distributional and enforcement 
issues. Two additional explanatory factors are addressed: uncertainty and number of actors. In 
particular, the latter should be an important factor accounting for different design features 
through bilateral, regional or multilateral trade cooperation. While there exists some 
systematic research on the design of bilateral investment treaties (Allee and Peinhardt 2010), 
less attention has been paid to the design features of PTAs across regions and time. Finally, 
some scholarship at the crossroad of the legalization and the rational design literature has 
addressed the question of optimal institutional features that balance commitment and high 
levels of delegation with necessities to allow for escape mechanisms or forms of “efficient 
breach” (Goldstein and Martin 2000; Rosendorff and Milner 2001, Rosendorff 2005, Baccini 
2009, Schropp 2010). 
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Diffusion  
A large political science literature studies diffusion processes across borders. Among the 
many policies, institutions, and events that spread across borders, previous studies have 
looked at regulatory agencies (Jordana et al. 2011), international agreements (Elkins et al. 
2006; Barthel and Neumayer 2010; Baccini and Dür 2011), tax policy (Swank 2006), 
democracy (Gleditsch and Ward 2008) and conflicts (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). Data on 
the design of PTAs will allow us to shed light on the conditions under which policies spread 
across borders and the mechanisms through which policies spread (coercion, competition, 
learning or emulation). Specific questions that can be addressed are: do provisions in PTAs 
spread? If yes, in which sequence do different countries adopt these provisions? What does 
this sequence tell us about the mechanism of diffusion? 
 
Political and economic effects of trade agreements 
The effects of PTAs on economic variables have been thoroughly studied by economists. A 
vast body of literature explores the impact of PTAs on national and world welfare by looking 
at the relative magnitude of trade creation and trade diversion (Viner 1950; Bhagwati 1993; 
Krugman 1991; Summers 1991). Moreover, countless studies investigate the impact of trade 
agreements on trade flows (Rose 2004; Goldstein et al. 2007) and foreign direct investment 
(Büthe and Milner 2008) using a gravity model. Interestingly enough, the findings of these 
studies often conflict with one another. We identify a poor operationalization of PTAs on the 
right-hand side of the econometric equation as one of the main problems of such studies. 
Looking at the content of PTAs would allow us to overcome some of these measurement 
inconsistencies and provide a better understanding of the impact of PTAs on both trade flows 
and FDI. Other recent studies explore the impact on political variables. Among these, some 
studies (Pevehouse 2005; Pevehouse and Russet 2006) argue that certain IOs, including some 
PTAs, increase the probability of democratization. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) show that 
PTAs help countries to peacefully settle conflicts and mitigate the risk of such conflicts 
escalating into full-blown war. Finally, others (Ethier 1998; Fernandez and Portes 1998) claim 
that PTAs help developing countries to implement and lock in economic reforms. Future 
studies could explore these arguments in more detail. Specifically, we could assess the impact 
of PTAs on economic reforms looking at specific provisions – enforcement provisions, for 
instance – in specific sectors, such as intellectual property rights. In addition, the design of 
PTAs in combination with domestic institutions and leaders‟ preferences may shed new light 
on why and when developing countries decide to implement economic reforms. 
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Power  
How and when states exercise power in international politics is one of the key questions in the 
field of International Relations (Baldwin 2002; Barnett and Duvall 2005). The design of PTAs 
is indicative of power relations as preferences over the contents and institutional setup of such 
agreements vary across states. In particular, developed countries are likely to prefer deeper 
agreements than developing ones. To the extent that there is variation across North-South 
agreements, this may be due to some developing countries having more power (issue specific 
or structural) than others. Thus, the data will be useful in exploring to what degree and under 
what conditions power asymmetry is reflected in the design of PTAs. 
 
Forum shopping/overlapping regimes  
Systematic analyses addressing the effects of overlapping regimes on the evolving politics of 
forum-shopping are scant (Young 1996; Aggarwal 1998; Raustiala and Victor 2004; Alter and 
Meunier 2007; Dupont and Elsig 2011). Drezner (2006) suggests that more powerful states 
are better able to cope with overlapping jurisdictions and increased legalization. He argues 
that (too much) legalization has empowered stronger states. This observation runs counter to 
the conventional wisdom related to how legalization constrains the abuse of power (Grant and 
Keohane 2005). Focusing on interaction across regimes, Shaffer and Pollack (2010) argue that 
soft law regimes may be “hardened” through regime linkage, while hard law regimes may be 
“softened”. Put differently, linking soft law regimes (other policy fields, bilateral economic 
cooperation) with hard law regimes (WTO) may have important spill-over effects. Some 
initial work on forum-shopping in the area of trade has focused on dispute settlement (Davis 
2006, Busch 2007). Busch (2007) argues that forum shopping is not only about the likelihood 
of the claimant‟s success, but is also about setting a precedent that is useful for case-law 
development. Pauwelyn (2009) describes how the WTO and regional dispute settlement 
mechanisms increasingly overlap, and offers rules on how to address sequencing and conflicts 
arguing that the WTO cannot remain indifferent to forum exclusion clauses in PTAs. Yet, 
there is little research on forum-shopping (Bernauer et al. 2011). Given the increasing number 
of PTAs, we expect our data-set to be also useful in order to address questions emerging from 
this research program. 
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Our sample of PTAs 
 
Our objective has been to cover all negotiated trade agreements signed between 1945 and 
2009 that include concrete steps, that is, potentially be covered by GATT Article XXIV, the 
GATT Enabling Clause, or GATS Article 5, towards the preferential liberalization of trade in 
goods or services.
6
 By including “negotiated” in our definition, we exclude one-sided 
preference schemes such as the Generalized System of Preferences. The term “concrete” 
means that we did not consider agreements that only include vague provisions on objectives, 
without specifying specific measures that will be carried out in a reasonable time frame. This 
excludes framework agreements that often precede the conclusion of actual PTAs (for 
example, the 2003 framework agreement between India and ASEAN) and partnership and 
cooperation agreements (for example, EU-Ukraine 1998).
7
 “Preferential” indicates that we 
excluded agreements that extend steps to liberalize trade to third countries without asking for 
reciprocity. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, for example, is a grouping that we do not 
consider in this project. Moreover, we exclude agreements that simply extend most-favored 
nation treatment to countries that are not members of the World Trade Organization. The 
preferences can be one-sided as is the case for the European Union‟s Lomé agreements.  
We used a variety of sources to identify the relevant trade agreements. Our main 
sources were the list maintained by the World Trade Organization, the Tuck Trade 
Agreements and McGill Faculty of Law Preferential Trade Agreements databases, and the list 
collated by Gary Clyde Hufbauer.
8
 After eliminating overlaps and some agreements that did 
not fit our definition, and adding agreements especially from the Middle East, we ended up 
with a database of 690 agreements.
9
 So far, we have been able to code 404 of these 
                                                 
6
 Importantly, we do not consider agreements that touch upon “trade and” issues such as competition policy or 
movement of natural persons unless the same agreement also includes provisions that are directly aimed at 
enhancing market access for goods and/or services. This excludes some very far-reaching agreements, such as 
EU-Switzerland Bilateral Agreements II, which cover everything from taxation to free movement of persons. 
7
 We decided to include a few borderline agreements such as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, and the Protocol on 
Trade Negotiations.  
8
 These databases are available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/summary_e.xls; 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~tradedb/; and http://ptas.mcgill.ca/. We also relied on other webpages, such as 
www.bilaterals.org and http://www.cuts-citee.org/PTADossier.htm, to get a full list of agreements signed more 
recently. For the Hufbauer list, see Hufbauer 2007. 
9
 To compare, as of October 2010 the WTO list of agreements, including those signed but not yet in force, 
encompasses 419 agreements (both goods and services agreements). Our dataset also includes agreements 
enlarging and deepening pre-existing agreements. For instance, for the EU we coded the Rome Treaty (1957), 
the enlargement treaties, and the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam 
Treaty (1997), the Nice Treaty (2001), and the Lisbon Treaty (2007). In contrast to the WTO list, we did not 
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agreements. We currently have not coded texts for the other agreements mentioned in these 
sources because we were unable to find the full texts of some agreements and because of time 
constraints. The agreements not yet coded introduce a certain bias, as many of them are older 
agreements, partial agreements, and agreements among lesser developed countries.
10
 
Nevertheless, our sample contains virtually all the countries in the world and covers all the 
types of agreements defined above. The following graphs give an overview of the agreements 
that we have coded.  
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Figure 1: New PTAs over time 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of agreements signed over time (including the percentage of the 
agreements that we have coded so far). This figure confirms the common view of a stark 
increase in the number of agreements signed in the 1990s. Currently, we only know the data 
of signature of an agreement; our data on the date of entry into force still has some gaps at the 
time of writing. As we do not know which agreements disappear over time, we cannot give 
cumulative numbers. The oldest agreement that we include is the South Africa-Southern 
                                                                                                                                                        
include interim agreements and we separately counted services agreements only if the services agreement was 
signed in a different year than the goods agreement.  
10
 We may also be missing (or may not have coded) some protocols that were added to agreements after they 
were signed. Our strategy has been to include all protocols in the coding exercise that are referenced in the main 
text of an agreement. 
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Rhodesia Customs Union from 1948 (Interim Agreement for the re-establishment of a 
customs union between the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia).
11
 The trend sees a 
peak in the period 2000-2004, when about 22 agreements were signed each year. Since then, 
we have seen a slight decline in the number of PTAs signed, largely due to a decline in the 
number of agreements among European countries.  
Figure 2a distinguishes between different types of agreement. We use the categories 
bilateral, plurilateral, region-country, and inter-regional agreements to classify agreements. 
Plurilateral are all agreements that include more than two countries, but do not fall into the 
region-country or inter-regional categories. Inter-regional agreements are those signed 
between two regional entities. 53 percent of the agreements in our database are bilateral and 
only 3 percent of our agreements are inter-regional ones. The figure also shows that our 
sample of coded agreements contains slightly fewer bilateral agreements than the 
population.
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Figure 2a & 2b: PTAs by (a) type of agreement and (b) region 
 
In terms of geographical distribution, Figure 2b lists the agreements by continent, using the 
United Nations classification to assign countries to a continent.
12
 We define agreements 
crossing regions as “cross-continent”. Some of the agreements falling under this category are 
actually agreements between countries that are geographically close, such as Bulgaria 
                                                 
11
 In fact, the origins of this agreement go back to 1910.  
12
 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm.  
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(Europe) and Turkey (Asia). The data confirms the conventional view that most agreements 
have been signed among European countries, although the number of PTAs crossing regions 
is not much lower. Again, figure 2b shows a small bias in our sample of coded agreements in 
favor of European agreements and cross-continent agreements.  
In Figure 3, we show the regional distribution of agreements over time. Two trends are 
particularly evident from this graph: first, the sharp increase in the number of agreements in 
the 1990s was driven by European countries. Second, more recently, cross-continent 
agreements are the dominant form of PTAs.  
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Figure 3: Regional distribution of PTAs by time period 
 
Finally, in Figure 4 we distinguish between North-North, North-South and South-South 
agreements. North-North agreements are those among the United States, Canada, Western 
European countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
13
 North-South agreements are those 
signed between one or several of the above countries and all other countries. South-South 
agreements are those excluding the above countries. The figure clearly shows that the number 
                                                 
13
 Clearly, this list of “Northern” countries is debatable.  Countries that can be considered developed at least for 
parts of the period covered are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, several Central and Eastern 
European countries, and Israel. A better approach would be to classify agreements by comparing the Gross 
Domestic Product per capita of member countries; however, this goes beyond what we could do at this stage of 
the project. 
 14 
of South-South agreements by far outstrips the number of North-North or North-South 
agreements. 
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Figure 4: Agreements by level of development of member countries 
 
We have coded the 404 agreements for a total of 10 broad sectors of cooperation. Some of 
these sectors are divided into sub-sectors. The number of items coded varies from one sector 
to another: from a minimum of six for the sector government procurement to a maximum of 
30 for the sector market access. 
 
The design of PTAs  
 
In the following, we provide an overview of the sectors coded and some selected descriptive 
evidence on the design of the PTAs (additional information on the coding strategy is found in 
the penultimate section of the paper).    
 
Market access  
In terms of market access, we code general characteristics of tariff schedules, degree of 
concessions, tariff peaks, exemptions, speed and depth (e.g., Hicks and Kim 2009). We focus 
on the types of templates used: First, we code whether states work with the Harmonized 
System (HS) or a national system, which particular HS references are used (as these have 
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been regularly updated; HS 1988/92 - very similar and therefore usually combined, HS 1996, 
HS 2002 and HS 2007) and at which digit level concessions are listed. Second, the coding 
differentiates whether the parties agree on a uniform (basket) approach or whether there are 
areas that have a specific treatment (e.g., agriculture, fishery products, textiles, etc) 
(Estevadeordal et al. 2009). This is usually reflected in a positive list approach, a negative list 
approach or a combination of both. We further code whether there is an explicit stand-still 
clause (that parties cannot increase tariffs during negotiations). 
With respect to concessions (depth), we focus on the absolute and relative numbers of 
tariff lines with concessions (and the number of tariff rate quota lines with concessions). We 
also code exemptions (no concessions) and the treatment of tariff peaks (remaining, 
decreasing, removed). We calculate average tariffs ex ante and ex post the transition period 
(where available). To capture the speed of concessions, we code the pattern of liberalization 
over the transition period for tariff lines and tariff quotas focusing on the degrees of early 
liberalization, gradual liberalization and liberalization towards the end of the transition period.  
Finally, we code whether agreements regulate export taxes. A first round of coding 
will be finalized by December 2011. 
 
Services 
Several previous attempts have been made to code the services provisions in PTAs, all of 
which have looked at a smaller number of PTAs (Stephenson 2002; Mattoo and Sauvé 2007; 
Roy et al. 2007; Fink and Molinuevo 2008; Heydon and Woolcock 2009; Marchetti and Roy 
2009). Other studies have concentrated on the comparison of the provisions for specific 
services sectors (aviation, financial services etc.) or specific modes of supply (e.g., movement 
of natural persons) across a number of PTAs (see, for example, some contributions in 
Marchetti and Roy 2009). Our coding scheme builds on these previous studies, but refrains 
from coding the liberalization commitment for each services subsector (the WTO‟s list 
distinguishes more than 150 such sub-sectors, ranging from veterinary services to electronic 
mail) across all four modes of services supply (cross-border supply, consumption abroad, 
commercial presence, and movement of natural persons). We decided not to code at this level 
of detail because 600 coding decisions
14
 across more than 400 agreements went beyond what 
we could feasibly achieve.  
                                                 
14
 In fact, since commitments may not be completely symmetric across member states, the actual number of 
coding decisions would be 600 times the number of member states. The study that comes closest to coding at this 
level of detail is Roy et al. (2007) who code the commitments for 36 WTO members in the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services and in PTAs across all 150 services subsectors for two modes of supply (cross-border trade 
and commercial presence).   
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 Our initial interest is simply whether an agreement includes any substantive provisions 
on the liberalization of trade in services, or mentions this liberalization as an objective.
15
 We 
then distinguish between positive and negative list approaches to the liberalization of services 
trade. Agreements with a negative list approach tend to be more far-reaching than those with a 
positive list approach (Fink and Molinuevo 2008). In addition to this, we checked whether the 
agreement explicitly included or excluded 11 broad services sectors (from business to 
transport services). We also coded the presence or absence of MFN, national treatment, non-
establishment, and movement of natural persons clauses, with the latter two capturing two 
modes of services supply. Finally, we coded whether or not the services chapter includes a 
continuous review provision.  
 Figure 5a shows that less than a quarter of all agreements included in our coding 
exercise have a substantial services chapter (23 percent). Another third, however, mentions 
the liberalization of services trade as an objective, whereas 45 percent of all do not mention 
trade in services. Importantly, some agreements that are coded as having no substantive 
services provisions may still have chapters on specific services sectors, such as financial 
services or transport services. Figure 5b makes a distinction between North-North, North-
South, and South-South agreements. Of the three, North-South agreements have the most far-
reaching and South-South agreements the shallowest services provisions. 
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Figures 5a & 5b: Services coverage in PTAs by (a) scope and (b) level of development 
 
As expected, the percentage of agreements with substantive services provisions has been 
growing for the last couple of years. In fact, a large majority of agreements signed between 
                                                 
15
 We use services chapter as a short hand for substantive measures, which may also be found in declarations 
added to an agreement. Non-legally binding provisions (as those included in a declaration attached to the 1985 
Israel-U.S. agreement) are coded as objective only, as are agreements that only write down an MFN obligation. 
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2005 and 2009 includes a service chapter. By contrast, before 1985 hardly any agreements 
foresaw the liberalization of services trade. We also witness substantial variation across 
continents in the depth of services provisions. The largest share of agreements with 
substantive services provisions is to be found in the Americas, whereas we have only two 
coded African agreements in the database with substantive services provisions. Also the large 
majority of intra-European agreements either do not mention the liberalization of services 
trade (especially the older ones) or do so only as an objective to be reached at a later stage. 
When comparing types of agreements (bilateral, plurilateral, region-country, and region-
region agreements), no particular trend becomes apparent.  
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Figures 6a-6d: Services sectors by region (percentages are calculated in relation to all 
agreements that at least mention services liberalization)
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Figures 6a to 6d provide evidence with respect to the more detailed items that we coded for 
each services sector, always distinguishing by region. Clearly, most agreements with 
substantive services provisions adopt a negative list approach. Interestingly, Asian agreements 
are an exception to this rule. MFN clauses are rather rare in the agreements that mention at 
least the objective of services trade liberalization, and are not used in European agreements. 
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 The values shown in Figures 6a and 6c do not add up to 100 percent as coding the approach to liberalization 
and national treatment provisions only makes sense for agreements with substantive services provisions. 
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Most agreements with substantive provisions on services trade liberalization include a 
national treatment clause. Finally, across all continents many agreements include a continuous 
review provision, which is a clause that stipulates further negotiations on the liberalization of 
trade in services. 
 
Investment  
Our coding strategy focuses on eights sets of variables: 1) sectoral coverage; 2) scope of non-
discrimination provisions; 3) most-favored nation (MFN); 4) national treatment (NT); 5) 
standards of treatment; 6) transfer of payments; 7) dispute settlement mechanism (DSM); 8) 
temporary movement of business and natural people. Sectoral Coverage is the most important 
variable in determining the scope of investment protection. First, in coding this variable we 
distinguish among PTAs that do not include any investment provisions and PTAs that do. 
Second, among the latter PTAs we categorize whether PTAs include a vague statement on 
investment protection, rely on bilateral investment treaties previously signed by member 
countries, contain investment provisions only in the service sector (GATS type), and PTAs 
that have an ad hoc section on investment (NAFTA type).   
 The scope of non-discrimination provisions allows checking in which phase(s) (if at 
all) of the investment procedure foreign investors are protected. In coding MFN and NT we 
distinguish between negative list and positive list; the former one being a stronger form of 
investment protection than the latter one. MFN and NT are contingent standards based on the 
treatment afforded to other groups of investors, whereas the standards of treatment are based 
on customary international law (Lesher and Miroudot 2006: 14). Regarding transfers of 
payments, we code whether there are restrictions in transferring profits from the host country 
to the home country. Regarding the DSM, we assess the presence of a dispute settlement 
clause and also distinguish between an investor-state DSM and a state-state dispute DSM. 
Finally, we code whether there are restrictions for movement of key personnel, e.g. managers 
and chairmen of the board, and business. 
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Figure 7: Investment coverage in PTAs 
 
A third of the agreements included in our coding exercise do not mention investment at all 
(Figure 7). 40 percent of the agreements mention investment protection as a general objective, 
often in the preamble, without including any further provisions on how to realize and enforce 
such protection. Moreover, only a handful of PTAs rely on provisions included in a bilateral 
investment treaty previously signed by the same two countries (three percent). Similarly, only 
two percent of PTAs regulate investment protection in the service sector. PTAs signed by the 
EU with developing countries fall in this category. Finally, almost 20 percent of PTAs include 
a separate chapter on investment protection. In sum, only a relatively low number of PTAs 
contain strict regulations on investment.   
As with other sectors, the percentage of agreements with investment protection 
provisions has been growing over time (see Figure 8a) and it is a feature of new regionalism 
(Ethier 1998). Interestingly, the majority of PTAs signed in the last five years include an 
investment chapter, that is to say, double the number of PTAs that make no mention of 
investment protection. Moreover, Figure 8b shows that bilateral agreements are the deepest 
PTAs in terms of investment protection. Indeed, more than 40 percent of bilateral agreements 
include a chapter on investment. Finally, developed economies tend to form PTAs that 
include stricter regulation on investment than developing countries do. This does not come as 
a surprise. Since they have the largest share of FDI outflows, highly industrialized countries 
are particularly concerned in protecting their investments. 
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Figures 8a & 8b: Investment sectors by (a) time period and (b) type 
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Figures 8c & 8d: Investment sectors by (c) region and (d) level of development 
 
In terms of dispute settlement mechanisms, Figure 9 shows that only one third of PTAs has 
either an investor-state DSM or a state-state DSM. This percentage is higher for north-south 
PTAs relatively to north-north PTAs and south-south PTAs. Indeed, almost 50 percent of the 
north-south PTAs include either an investor-state DSM or a state-state DSM. As for sectoral 
coverage, the number of PTAs that include a DSM on investment has increased sharply in the 
last decade (Figure 10). Overall, we can conclude that investments are still poorly protected 
by PTAs, though there is evidence that countries have become more concerned with this issue 
over the last ten years. 
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 Figure 9: Investment-related dispute settlement provisions 
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Figure 10a & 10b: Investment-related dispute settlement provisions by (a) time period and 
(b) level of development  
 
 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Our coding strategy focuses on three sets of variables for intellectual property rights (IPRs): 
1) general statement on IPRs; 2) IPR Conventions; 3) scope of IPR protection. Regarding 
general statement on IPRs, the aim is to distinguish among PTAs that do not include any IPR 
provisions and PTAs that do. Regarding IPR Conventions, we code whether PTAs include 
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specific deadlines for acceding to key multilateral conventions on the protection of IPR. 
Regarding scope of IPR protection, we code whether there are provisions protecting IPRs in 
specific sector (e.g., pharmaceutical industry). Moreover, we coded 1 when there are 
provisions that require products to specify the geographical provenance. Finally, we coded 1 
if there is a specific provision on the enforcement of regulations related to IPRs protection. 
 Figure 11 shows IPR coverage for all PTAs in the sample. Specifically, coders were 
asked to answer 10 yes or no questions related to IPRs. High numbers imply strong coverage 
of IPRs, e.g. a score of 10 implies that a coder answered yes, i.e. she coded 1, to every 
question. More than forty percent of PTAs have no provision on IPRs and more that two 
thirds have only weak IPRs coverage, i.e. IPRs total coverage scores lower than or equal to 2. 
Roughly ten percent of PTAs have strong IPR coverage, i.e. IPRs total coverage scores at 
least 7. EU and US bilateral trade agreements fall in this category.  
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Figure 11: Coverage of intellectual property rights.
17
 
 
Figure 12 shows that provisions on IPRs have been included in PTAs only in the last 20 years. 
Against the background of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement, signed by WTO members in 1994, there is evidence that (at least) some countries 
do not find existing provisions included in this multilateral agreement sufficient and try to 
regulate IPRs bilaterally. Moreover, this finding suggests that a small percentage of PTAs 
include WTO-plus provisions on IPRs. Finally, and not surprisingly, north-south PTAs 
include stronger IPRs protection compare to north-north and south-south PTAs.  
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 10  yes (coded one) or no (coded zero) questions related to provision protecting IPRs. High numbers imply 
strong coverage of IPRs. 
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Figures 12a &12b: Coverage of intellectual property rights by (a) time period and (b) level of 
development  
 
 
Government procurement  
With respect to provisions governing public procurement, again building on previous studies 
in this area (Heydon and Woolcock 2009), we first coded whether an agreement included the 
regulation of procurement policies as a general objective or in form of substantive rules. We 
also coded the presence or not of a national treatment clause, a transparency clause, and a 
reference to the GATT/WTO rules on public procurement. Finally, we coded the scope of the 
procurement provisions (if any) in terms of entities (government, sub-national governments, 
state-owned enterprises) and type of purchase (goods and/or services) covered. 
 About 50 percent of the agreements have a reference to government procurement, but 
only 14 percent include substantive procurement provisions (that is, provisions that go beyond 
stating adherence to the WTO agreement on procurement or the desire to exchange 
information in this area) (Figures 13a & 13b) 
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Figures 13a & 13b: Coverage of government procurement provisions by (a) substance and b) 
level of development 
 
Again, as with the other sectors coded here, it is evident that over time the depth of integration 
has increased with respect to government procurement (Figure 13c). Government 
procurement provisions are virtually absent from African agreements; by contrast, the share of 
agreements with substantive procurement provisions is highest for agreements in the 
Americas (Figure 13d).  
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Figures 13c & 13d: Coverage of government procurement provisions by (c) time period and 
(d) by region 
 
Basically all of the agreements with substantive provisions grant national treatment with 
respect to government procurement. Throughout, they tend to extend this treatment to goods 
and services; moreover, they apply not only to the national government, but also to 
subnational governments and state-owned enterprises (although many agreements include 
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positive lists of such enterprises). More than half of all agreements that mention access to 
government procurement at least as objective make a reference to the GATT/WTO agreement 
on government procurement, whereas only a quarter include a transparency provision.  
 
Competition 
With regard to competition-related obligations, we first seek to capture the importance given 
to this area by the contracting parties. We code whether competition is covered in a chapter or 
single articles. We also record whether agreements have provisions related to subsidies, 
coding whether these are allowed or out-ruled, and whether specific references to the 
GATT/WTO agreement are made. Second, we compile information on the scope of areas 
covered in an agreement (e.g., monopolies and cartels, mergers and acquisitions, state trading 
enterprises, state aid (and as an extra category structural adjustment provisions)) (see also Teh 
2009) and the degree of cooperation measured by the forms of cooperation (general obligation 
not to distort competition, exchange information, notification, establish national competition 
authorities, establish working groups, coordination among authorities of partner countries, 
creation of common competition authority).  
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Figures 14a & 14b: Provisions on competition by (a) scope and (b) level of development 
 
Figures 14a and 14b show descriptive statistics related to the existence of provisions in the 
field of competition. The existence of a competition chapter indicates the importance 
attributed to this area by the contracting parties. While only 24 percent have a chapter 
dedicated to competition, more than 80 percent of PTAs have competition-related provisions. 
Only after 1990 parties started to integrate full chapters on competition into agreements. In 
terms of development, north-north and north-south agreements have a relative high number of 
competition chapters (roughly 50 percent). 
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Figures 15a-15e: Coverage of competition issues by (a) coverage (b) region, (c) time period, 
(d) type of agreement and (e) level of development
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 The values shown in figures 15a-15e go beyond 100 percent as the same agreement can feature multiple 
competition-related provisions. The same applies to figures 17, 18, 20, 23 & 24. 
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When we look at the coverage, the data shows that most provisions are related to state aid (71 
percent) and least to mergers and acquisitions (about 5 percent) (Figure 15a). African trade 
agreements feature least and European trade agreements most provisions (Figure 15b). 
Focusing on the past 20 years, we see that there are fewer provisions – in relative terms – on 
structural adjustment and there an increasing number of PTAs that also regulate mergers and 
acquisitions (Figure 15c). As to type of PTA, we see in particular a relative high attention 
paid to state aid in region-country agreements (Figure 15d). Finally, from a development 
perspective, we observe a relative importance of state aid and little attention to M&A 
provisions in south-south agreements, while little attention is paid in north-north agreement in 
relation to structural adjustment (Figure 15e). 
Figures 16a-16e illustrate the degree of cooperation in this field ranging from 
declarations not to distort competition and lose cooperation on information exchange to the 
creation of a common authority that manages competition policy. Generally, cooperation is 
low in Asia and Africa and substantially higher in other parts of the world. Over time, in 
particular information exchange and other coordination provisions have significantly 
increased after the end of the Cold War. From the development perspective (figure 16e), 
north-north agreements foresee a relative high degree of cooperation, north-south are in 
particular focusing on institutionalized cooperation between national authorities, and south-
south agreements put less emphasis on institutionalized cooperation.  
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Figures 16a-16e: Cooperation on competition policy by (a) type of cooperation, (b) region, 
(c) time period, (d) type of agreement and (e) level of development 
 
 
Trade defence instruments 
Besides a general coding on competition, we focus on three specific unilateral trade policy 
measures: anti-dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards provisions (see also Teh et al. 
2009). We code whether these trade defence instruments (TDIs)
19
 (also called trade remedies) 
are allowed or out-ruled and whether specific references to the GATT/WTO agreements are 
made. In terms of safeguards, we also code whether specific exceptions related to balance of 
payments exist. Figures 17a-17e provide an overview on the general TDI categories. In the 
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 TDI as defined by the European Commission 
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figures, we have also included balance of payments-related exceptions. TDIs are frequently 
used across regions as well as in bilateral and regional agreements. The patterns are strikingly 
similar across the various categories. 
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Figures 17a-17e: Coverage of trade defence instruments by (a) coverage, (b) region, (c) time 
period, (d) type of agreement and (e) level of development 
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Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures 
Our coding of TBTs and SPS measures first concentrates on the presence or not of any 
provisions for these potential nontariff barriers.
20
 For both areas, we also code references to 
GATT/WTO provisions, provisions calling for cooperation and information exchange, and 
provisions stipulating the harmonization of rules. For TBTs, we also code whether the 
agreement encourages the use of international standards and whether the section on TBTs 
makes any reference to resolving disputes.  
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Figures 18a-18d: Provisions on (a) technical barriers to trade (TBT), (b) sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS), (c) TBT by level of development and (d) SPS by level of 
development 
 
An analysis of provisions for TBT and SPS measures shows that about 60 percent of all 
agreements coded include TBT measures and even 67 percent SPS measures (Figures 18a and 
18b). When comparing across North-North, North-South and South-South agreements, it 
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 For a previous study that compares agreements with respect to TBTs and SPS, see Heydon and Woolcock 
(2009).  
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becomes evident that both TBT and SPS provisions are most likely included in North-South 
agreements. North-North agreements are the least far-reaching in that regard.  
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Figures 19a-19d: Provisions on technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS) by (a&b) time period and (c&d) region 
 
 
Analyzing the development over time, Figures 19a to 19b show that agreements signed in the 
1990s and 2000s are much more likely to include TBT and SPS provisions than older 
agreements. When comparing across regions (Figures 19c and 19d), the small share of Asian 
agreements with TBT and SPS provisions is remarkable, more so if we consider that many of 
them have been signed more recently. 
 Interestingly, the TBT provisions included in most agreements are rather shallow. 
Only about 20 percent of all agreements make reference to the aims of adopting international 
standards or harmonizing standards for members party to the PTA. Many of the agreements 
(41 percent), however, include a reference to the WTO TBT agreement, and 49 percent 
stipulate that parties should cooperate in this area. 30 percent also stipulate that parties should 
cooperate in the field of SPS measures.  
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Dispute Settlement 
Our coding strategy for dispute settlement focuses on five sets of variables: existence of 
provisions, degree of delegation, choice of dispute settlement forum, implementation 
(bindingness and sanctions), and exemptions. With regard to the degree of delegation (see 
Abbott et al. 2000) we capture the extent to which parties allow delegation to occur 
(consultation, mediation, arbitration, creation of a standing body, or use of external dispute 
settlement forms). As to the choice of forum, we code whether parties can choose from 
different dispute settlement mechanisms and what rules apply (in particular restrictions to 
forum choice).  
 Implementation-related coding covers a range of issues. We record in particular the 
rules related to the use of sanctions, including the aspect of who selects appropriate sanctions 
(disputing parties jointly, complainant, or third party), as well as the form of sanctions 
(sanction in the same sector, cross-retaliation - sanctions in other sectors, monetary 
compensations). Under exemptions we document whether areas are exempted from dispute 
settlement through a positive list or a negative list approach.  
 Figures 20a-20e provide an overview for provisions related to the degree of 
delegation. 
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Figures 20a-20e: Degree of delegation by (a) instrument, (b) region, (c) time period, (d) type 
of agreement and (e) level of development 
 
Figure 20a shows that around a quarter of all agreements foresee the possibility to refer to 
treaty-external institutions of dispute settlement. Mediation and the creation of standing 
bodies are the least found options. Dispute settlement is largely dominated by consultation 
procedures (90 percent) and forms of arbitration (45 percent). Across regions, it is interesting 
to note that in particular Asian and American agreements rely on external institutions, while 
mediation is absent in European and African agreements. Arbitration is mostly offered in 
American agreements. Over time references to external bodies (mostly GATT/WTO) also 
increase, while the creation of treaty-internal standing bodies is less frequently observed. 
Finally, mediation provisions have gained popularity in the last 10 years. References to 
external bodies have been used in particular in the newer treaties. The distinction of 
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agreement types provides evidence that plurilateral agreements (which includes EU and EU 
accession agreements) include fewer references to external bodies and rely more on standing 
bodies; bilateral agreements put more emphasis on arbitration and lack provisions on the 
creation of new bodies (would probably be too costly). In terms of development, south-south 
agreements are generally less legalized, but still a significant number of treaties foresee a 
standing court. The few north-north agreements lack mediation as a form of dispute 
settlement. 
provision on external DS institution restrictions on use of multiple fora
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
5
10
15
20
25
Europe Asia Africa America Oceania Cross
provision on external DS institution
restrictions on use of multiple fora
Region
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
 
1945-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09
provision on external DS institution
restrictions on use of multiple fora
Time
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
5
10
15
20
bilateral plurilateral
region-
 country
inter-
 regional
provision on external DS institution
restrictions on use of multiple fora
Type of agreement
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
 
 35 
North-North North-South South-South
provision on external DS institution
restrictions on use of multiple fora
Level of development
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
 
Figures 21a-21e: Choice of forum by (a) provisions/restrictions (b) region, (c) time period, 
(d) type of agreement and (e) level of development 
 
Figures 21a-21e map the provisions on external dispute settlement institutions and the 
existence of restrictions related to the choice of forum. Figure 21c illustrates an increase in the 
last 10 years of both potential recourse to external institutions and restrictions. The data 
actually shows that restrictions are an often observed phenomenon which stands in contrast to 
some conventional wisdom that suggests a lack or addressing forum choice. Further, variation 
as to the existence of external institutions and choice of forum is visible along the regional 
dimension. Africa and Europe have little outside references to judicial bodies, whereas this 
seems to be a more established practice in the Americas. Interestingly south-south agreements 
foresee when referring to external bodies systematically a restriction to forum-shopping, 
while in north-north and north-south some exceptions exist. 
Finally, when mapping the forms of sanctions in case of non-implementation (Figures 
22a-22d), we observe that monetary sanctions are the most preferred option foreseen to 
induce compliance in Europe and in Africa. The time dimension further shows that until the 
end of the 1980s the only mentioned sanctioning mechanisms relied on monetary sanctions. 
Monetary sanctions are in particular found in regional agreements. Cross-sector sanction is as 
often foreseen as same-sector sanction, usually relying on a sequencing procedure according 
to which parties first apply sanction in the same sector and only then move towards cross-
retaliation.  
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Figures 22a-22d: Forms of sanctions by (a) instrument, (b) region, (c) time period and (d) 
type of agreement 
 
Non-trade issues (“political” issues) 
The main objective in this design category is to list types of non-trade issues that are 
addressed in PTAs. We focus on issues that are normally regulated in international legal 
instruments other than classical trade regulation. Types of non-trade issues are recorded from 
information available in the preamble and the remaining part of the agreement. Accordingly, 
we code the type of issues addressed in the agreement. In addition, we list related references 
to other international treaties or international organizations. We have identified six areas of 
non-trade issues: 1) corruption, 2) labor standards, 3) environmental protection, 4) human 
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rights, 5) democracy, and 6) military cooperation. In a separate category we list additional 
non-trade issues mentioned in the agreements; these include organized crime, drug smuggling, 
migration issues, economic development, common foreign policy, and financial assistance. 
The data will helpful for studying questions, such as whether and to what extent non-
economic, political issues have been taken up in PTAs across time and region (see also 
Hafner-Burton 2005).  
Figures 23a-23e map the number of areas which are covered in the treaty text. The 
predominant non-trade issues include cooperation on environmental protection, military 
cooperation and labor standards. Across regions, we observe significant coverage of labor 
standards in European agreements. Corruption-related obligations are in particular witnessed 
in the Western hemisphere. Military cooperation is most often observed in Asian and 
American treaties. Over time, we observe more attention to corruption, whereas human rights 
and governance issues drop in recent years from a very high level after the end of the Cold 
War. As to the types of agreements, bilateral agreements seem to be the preferred venue to 
address environmental concerns, however are less prevalent for dealing with human rights and 
democratic protection. If we compare South-South and North-South agreements, we observe 
important variation. South-South agreements focus more on environmental protection and 
military cooperation, yet less on democracy and human rights. 
Finally, we present some descriptive statistics about the scope of non-trade issues by 
creating an indicator from 0 (no non-trade issues) to 6 (all six areas). Figures 24a-24d provide 
an overview. Most agreements have a relative low scope (0-2), yet over time this changes 
significantly. Were first agreements without any reference to non-trade concerns, the 1990s 
saw a strong growth of agreements incorporating non-trade issues. In particular North-South 
and South-South agreements as well as African agreements are characterized by broad non-
trade concerns being addressed in the treaty design. 
 
 
 
 
 38 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
10
20
30
40
50
co
rr
up
tio
n
la
bo
r s
ta
nd
ar
ds
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n
hu
m
an
 ri
gh
ts
de
m
oc
ra
tic
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e
m
ili
ta
ry
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n
Europe Asia Africa America Oceania Cross
corruption
labor standards
environmental protection
human rights
democratic governance
military cooperation
Region
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
5
10
15
20
1945-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09
corruption
labor standards
environmental protection
human rights
democratic governance
military cooperation
Time
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
5
10
15
20
25
bilateral plurilateral
region-
 country
inter-
 regional
corruption
labor standards
environmental protection
human rights
democratic governance
military cooperation
Type of agreement
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
North-North North-South South-South
corruption
labor standards
environmental protection
human rights
democratic governance
military cooperation
Level of development
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
 
Figures 23a-23e: Political issues by (a) issue area, (b) region, (c) time period and (d) type of 
agreement and (e) level of development 
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Figures 24a-24d: Political issues by (a) number covered, (b) region, (c) time period and (d) 
level of development 
 
 
Coding work organization and reliability tests 
 
We employed eleven coders in carrying out this project. Specifically, two coders worked on 
services, procurement, technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures at the University of Salzburg. Six coders focused on market access (tariffs), 
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competition, trade defence instruments, dispute settlement mechanism and other provisions at 
the World Trade Institute at the University of Bern. Three coders worked on the sections 
investment and intellectual property rights at IMT Institute of Advanced Studies in Lucca. 
Importantly, the coders were extensively trained in order to give them high levels of 
reliability. The rationale of dividing the coding exercise by sectors rather than by PTAs is to 
improve coders‟ performance. Indeed, coders‟ learning is likely to be particularly quick if 
coders deal with the same sectors and they get familiar with specific topics.  
 At this stage of the project, each sector is coded by one coder (or sometimes two 
coders) using a coding scheme prepared by us. It is important to stress that in preparing the 
coding scheme we rely on the suggestions of experts in the field, mainly economists and trade 
lawyers, as well as previous articles that address similar topics. A list of papers that we used 
as base to our coding scheme is included in Table 1.  
 To check the reliability of our coders, three coders independently code a sub-sample 
of agreements, i.e. EU PTAs and US PTAs. Results from the Kappa statistics are 
remarkable.
21
 Indeed, the association among coders was higher than 85 percent for these 
PTAs.
22
 These findings are particularly encouraging since EU PTAs and US PTAs are 
famously the deepest and most complex agreements (e.g., Horn et al. 2009). However, it must 
be stressed that these PTAs are also very similar one to another in terms of structure, so 
coders‟ learning is likely to be quicker in these cases compare to other PTAs. 
 We implemented other checks to verify the reliability of our findings. Specifically, we 
compare the results that we obtained in coding the investment sector with the results that we 
obtained in coding the services sector. Indeed, the correlation between two sectors is expected 
to be high given the fact that they regulate similar issues (Houde et al. 2007). We run three 
different tests. First, the correlation between the presence of substantive provisions on 
services and the presence of substantive provisions on investment is .79. Second, the 
correlation between a MFN provision on service and a MFN provision on investment is .84. 
Third, the correlation between a NT provision on service and a NT provision on investment is 
.67. Overall, these results are very encouraging on the accuracy of our coding exercise. We 
intend to implement similar checks also for the other sectors of our coding scheme in the 
future. 
                                                 
21
 Cohen‟s kappa is a measure of association (correlation or reliability) between two measurements of the same 
individual when the measurements are categorical. Kappa is often used to study the agreement of two raters such 
as judges or doctors. Each rater classifies each individual into one of k categories. 
22
 Rules-of-thumb for kappa: values less than 0.40 indicate low association; values between 0.40 and 0.75 
indicate medium association; and values greater than 0.75 indicate high association between the two raters. 
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 A further reliability check is to compare our results with those reported in comparable 
studies (see Table 1). For example, comparing our coding of procurement provisions shows 
that of 39 agreements listed by Kono and Rickard (2010) as having a procurement chapter, we 
classify 33 as having substantive provisions and 6 as having procurement liberalization as an 
objective. Similar comparisons will be carried out for the other sectors that we are coding. 
 For the time being, it is our intention to test further the reliability of our coding 
exercise. We plan to do that in two stages. First, we will ask two coders independently to code 
a random sub-sample of agreements. Taking a random sub-sample should decrease the 
concern that some PTAs are easier to code than others or that the learning process is quicker 
for some PTAs compare to others. Second, we plan to use two coders to code every PTA in 
the sample. In doing so, we could not only test the overall reliability of our coders, but also 
resolve the inconsistency using a conciliator, i.e. a third person who decides the “right 
coding” in case of inconsistency.23 Finally, such an approach will allow us to incorporate 
coder‟s error in the final measurement of PTA scope, as suggested by previous studies in 
comparative politics (Benoit et al. 2009; Lowe et al. 2011).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has described a new dataset covering the design of PTAs signed since the end of 
World War II. Moreover, we have given indications as to how this data could be used to 
answer some important research questions related to PTAs. From this coding exercise, we 
derive three broad preliminary findings. First, we witness that the regional dimension seems 
to lose significance over time (and with it explanations rooted in the European integration 
literature). We observe in particular an important growth in the number of PTAs that involve 
countries from different continents. Second, the scope of PTAs widens over time. For 
instance, PTAs signed in the last decade include a larger number of provisions on trade-
related sectors than PTAs signed in the 1990s. Third, there seems to be important variation 
when comparing types of agreements, whereas differences across geographical regions seem 
at first sight less important. In particular, bilateral trade agreements tend to cover sectors that 
are not included in the majority of plurilateral agreements. 
What are the next steps? For the time being, we will tackle PTAs that have been left 
out from this first round of coding. In addition, market access will be coded in the months to 
come to ensure every sector is completed. Finally, we will make a major effort to check the 
                                                 
23
 For a similar approach see Melton et al. (2010). 
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reliability of our results, which will involve cross-checking between similar sectors, 
comparison with previous datasets on the design of PTAs, and double-coding of (at least) a 
sub-sample of PTAs. In the end, we hope that the data will prove useful for the scientific 
inquiry into the politics and economics of PTAs. 
 
References 
 
Abbott Kenneth, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan 
Snidal 2000. “The Concept of Legalization,” International Organization 54(3):401-19. 
Aggarval Vinod 1998. Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages and 
Nesting. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Alesina Alberto 1988. “Macroeconomics and Politics,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, volume 3, pp. 13-62.  
Alesina Alberto 1989. “Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies,” Economic 
Policy 8(1):55-98.  
Allee Todd 2005. “The „Hidden‟ Impact of the World Trade Organization on the Reduction of 
Trade Conflict,” Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 
Conference, Chicago, Illinois. 
Allee Todd and Clint Peinhardt 2010. “The Least BIT Rational: An Empirical Test of the 
„Rational Design‟ of Investment Treaties,” unpublished manuscript. 
Alter Karen and Sophie Meunier 2007. “The Politics of International Regime Complexity,” 
Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies Working Paper No. 3. 
Baccini Leonardo 2009. “Explaining Formation and Design of EU Trade Agreements: The 
Role of Transparency and Flexibility,” European Union Politics 11(2):195-217. 
Baccini Leonardo 2011. “Democratization and Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of 
Developing Countries,” European Journal of International Relations, forthcoming. 
Baccini Leonardo and Andreas Dür 2011. “The New Regionalism and Policy 
Interdependency,” British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming. 
Baier Scott and Jeffrey Bergstrand 2004. “On the Economic Determinants of Free Trade 
Agreements,” Journal of International Economics 64(1):29-63. 
Baldwin David 2002. “Power and International Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, London: SAGE, 
pp. 177-91. 
Baldwin Richard 1993. “A Domino Theory of Regionalism,” NBER Working Paper No. 
4465. 
Barnett Michael and Raymond Duvall (eds.) 2005. Power in Global Governance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Barthel Fabian and Eric Neumayer 2010. “I Sign If my Competitors Sign: Spatial Dependence 
in the Diffusion of Double Taxation Treaties,” unpublished manuscript.  
Benoit Kenneth and Michael Laver. 2006. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: 
Routledge.  
 43 
Benoit, Kenneth, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2009. “Treating Words as Data with 
Error: Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions.” American Journal of Political 
Science 53 (2): 495-513. 
Bernauer Thomas, Manfred Elsig and Joost Pauwelyn 2011. “Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
– Analysis and Problems”, in Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton and Robert M. Stern 
(eds.), Oxford Handbook of the WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Bhagwati Jagdish 1993. “Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview,” in Jaime de Melo 
and Arvind Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Budge Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Eric Tanenbaum with 
Richard Fording, Derek Hearl, Hee Min Kim, Michael McDonald and Sylvia Mendes 
2001. Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 
1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Buhaug Halvard and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch 2008. “Contagion or Confusion? Why 
Conflicts Cluster in Space,” International Studies Quarterly 52(2):215-33. 
Busch Marc 2007. “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in 
International Trade,” International Organization 61(4):735-61. 
Büthe Tim and Helen Milner 2008. “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into 
Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?,” 
American Journal of Political Science 52(4):741-62. 
Chase Kerry 2005. Trading Blocs: States, Firms, and Regions in the World Economy. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
Cukierman Alex, Stephan Webb and Bilin Neyapti 1992. “Measuring the Independence of the 
Central Banks and Its Effects on Policy Outcomes,” The World Bank Economic Review 
6(2):353-98. 
Davis Christina 2006. “The Politics of Forum Choice for Trade Disputes: Evidence from U.S. 
Trade Policy,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Philadelphia. 
Drezner Daniel 2006. “The Viscosity of Global Governance: When is Forum-Shopping 
Expensive?” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Poltitical Science 
Association, Philadelphia.  
Dupont Cédric and Manfred Elsig 2011. “Border Politics and International Regulation: A 
Framework of Analysis through the Prism of the World Trade Organization,” unpublished 
manuscript.  
Dür Andreas 2007. “EU Trade Policy as Protection for Exporters: The Agreements with 
Mexico and Chile,” Journal of Common Market Studies 45(4):833-55. 
Eijffinger Sylvester and Eric Schaling 1992. “Central Bank Independence: Criteria and 
Indices,” Tilburg University, Research Memorandum No. 548. 
Eijffinger Sylvester and Eric Schaling 1993. “Central Bank Independence: Theory and 
Evidence.” Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Discussion paper No. 
9325. 
Elkins Zachary, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton 2009. The Endurance of National 
Constitutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Elkins Zachary, Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons 2006. “Competing for Capital: The 
 44 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,” International Organization 
60(4):811-46. 
Elsig Manfred 2007. “The EU‟s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale 
of Agency Power?” Journal of Common Market Studies 45(4):927-48. 
Elsig Manfred and Cédric Dupont 2011. “European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic 
Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements,” Paper 
presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Boston. 
Estevadeordal Antoni, Matthew Shearer and Kati Suominen 2009. “Market Access Provisions 
in Regional Trade Agreements,” in Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen and Robert Teh 
(eds.), Regional Rules in the Global Trading System, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Estevadeordal Antoni and Kati Suominen 2007. “Sequencing Regional Trade Integration and 
Cooperation Agreements: Describing a New Dataset for a New Research Agenda,” 
Economie Internationale 109:53-82. 
Ethier Wilfred 1998. “The New Regionalism,” The Economic Journal 108(3):1149-61. 
Fernandez Raquel and Jonathan Portes 1998. “Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of 
Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements,” World Bank Economic Review 
12(2):197-220. 
Fink Carsten and Martin Molinuevo 2008. “East Asian Preferential Trade Agreements in 
Services: Liberalization Content and WTO Rules,” World Trade Review 7(4):641-73. 
Gleditsch Kristian and Michael Ward 2008. “Diffusion and the Spread of Democratic 
Institutions,” in Frank Dobbin, Geoffrey Garrett and Beth Simmons (eds.), The Global 
Diffusion of Markets and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goldstein Judith and Lisa Martin 2000. “Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic 
Politics: A Cautionary Note,” International Organization 54(3):603-32. 
Goldstein Judith, Douglas Rivers and Michael Tomz 2007. “Institutions in International 
Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade,” 
International Organization 61(1):37-67. 
Grant Ruth and Robert Keohane 2005. “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics,” American Political Science Review 99(1):29-44. 
Grilli Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini 1991. “Political and Monetary 
Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy 
6(2):341-92. 
Guzman Andrew 2008. How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hafner-Burton Emilie 2005. “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements 
Influence Government Repression,” International Organization 59(3):593-629.  
Haftel Yoram 2010. “Commerce and Institutions: Trade, Scope, and the Design of Regional 
Economic Organizations,” Paper presented at the Workshop on The Politics of 
Preferential Trade Agreements: Theory, Measurement, and Empirical Applications, 
Princeton University, April 30-May 1. 
Heydon Kenneth and Stephen Woolcock 2009. The Rise of Bilateralism: Comparing 
American, European, and Asian Approaches to Preferential Trade Agreements. Paris: 
United Nations University Press.  
 45 
Hicks, Raymond and Kris Johnson. 2011. “Protecting Trade and Investment: When Will 
Firms Demand More than a BIT?” Prepared for presentation at the 2011 Annual Meeting 
of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 1, 2011. 
Hicks Raymod and Soo Yeon Kim 2009. “Credible Commitment through PTAs and their 
Effects on Trade: A Study of Asia‟s Reciprocal Trade Agreements,” unpublished 
manuscript. 
Horn Henrik, Petros Mavroidis and Andre Sapir 2009. Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU 
and US Preferential Trade Agreements. Brussels: Bruegel. 
Houde Marie-France, Akshay Kolse-Patil and Sébastien Miroudot 2007. “The Interaction 
between Investment and Services Chapters in Selected Regional Trade Agreements,” 
OECD Trade Policy Working Papers No. 55.   
Hufbauer Gary Clyde 2007. “Preferential Trade Arrangements in the World Economy: Two 
New Databases and Seven Questions.” Bern: World Trade Institute. 
Jordana Jacint, David Levi-Faur and Xavier Fernandez 2011. “The Global Diffusion of 
Regulatory Agencies & the Restructuring of the State,” Comparative Political Studies, 
forthcoming. 
Kim Moonhawk 2010. “Bringing Trade Liberalization Back into Trade Agreements: 
Explaining the Variation in U.S. Preferential Trade Agreements,” Paper presented at the 
Workshop on The Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements: Theory, Measurement, and 
Empirical Applications, Princeton University, April 30-May 1. 
Klingemann Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Ian Budge, Judith Bara and Michael McDonald 
2006. Mapping Policy Preferences II: Parties, Electorates and Governments in Eastern 
Europe and the OECD 1990-2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Kono Daniel and Stephanie Rickard 2010. “Do Preferential Trade Agreements Discourage 
Procurement Discrimination?” Paper presented at the Workshop on The Politics of 
Preferential Trade Agreements: Theory, Measurement, and Empirical Applications, 
Princeton University, April 30-May 1. 
Koremenos Barbara 2005. “Contracting around International Uncertainty,” American 
Political Science Review 99(4):549-65. 
Koremenos Barbara 2007. “If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute 
Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?” Journal of Legal Studies 36:189-
212. 
Koremenos Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal 2001. “The Rational Design of 
International Institutions,” International Organization 55(4):761-99. 
Kucik Jeffey 2011. “The Domestic Politics of International Institutional Design: Industry 
Preferences over Preferential Trade Agreements,” unpublished paper.  
Krugman Paul 1991. “The Move toward Free Trade Zones,” in Lawrence H. Summers (ed.), 
Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones, Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank, 
pp. 7-42. 
Lesher Molly and Sébastien Miroudot 2006. “Analysis of the Economic Impact of Investment 
Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements”, OECD Trade Policy Working Papers No. 36. 
Lowe William, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov and Michael Laver 2011. “Scaling Policy 
Preferences from Coded Political Texts,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, forthcoming. 
 46 
Manger, Mark 2009. Investing in Protection: The Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements 
Between North and South. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mansfield Edward and Helen Milner 1999. “The New Wave of Regionalism,” International 
Organization 53(3):589-627. 
Mansfield Edward and Helen Milner 2010. “Votes, Vetoes, and Preferential Trading 
Agreements,” Paper prepared for the WTO workshop on PTAs in the New Era, Geneva, 
Nov. 4.  
Mansfield Edward, Helen Milner and Jon Pevehouse 2008. “Democracy, Veto Players, and 
the Depth of Regional Integration,” The World Economy 31(1):67-96. 
Mansfield Edward, Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff 2002. “Why Democracies Cooperate 
More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,” International Organization 
56(3):477-513. 
Mansfield Edward and Jon Pevehouse 2000. “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International 
Conflict,” International Organization 54(4):775-808. 
Mansfield Edward and Eric Reinhardt 2003. “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The 
Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements,” 
International Organization 57(4):829-62. 
Marchetti Juan and Martin Roy (eds.) 2009. Opening Markets for Trade in Services: 
Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO Negotiations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.   
Mattli Walter 1999. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Mattoo Aaditya and Pierre Sauvé 2007. „Regionalism in Services Trade,” in Aaditya Mattoo, 
Robert M. Stern and Gianni Zanini (eds.), A Handbook of International Trade in Services, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McCall Smith James 2000. “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism 
in Regional Trade Pacts,” International Organization 54(1):137-80.  
 
Melton, James, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Kalev Leetaru. 2010. On the 
Interpretability of Law: Lessons from the Decoding of National Constitutions. 
Unbpublushed manuscript. 
OECD 2002. Regional Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System. Paris: OECD. 
Pauwelyn Joost 2009. “Legal Avenues to „Multilateralise Regionalism‟: Beyond Article 
XXIV”, in Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low (eds.), Multilateralising Regionalism, 
Challenges for the Global Trading System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pevehouse Jon 2005. Democracy from Above? Regional Organizations and Democratization. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Pevehouse Jon and Bruce Russett 2006. “Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations Cause 
Peace,” International Organization 60(4):969-1000. 
Raustiala Kai and David Victor 2004. “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” 
International Organization 58(2):277-309. 
Ravenhill John 2008. “Regionalism”, in John Ravenhill (ed.), Global Political Economy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 47 
Rose Andrew 2004. “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?” The American 
Economic Review 94(1):98-114.  
Rosendorff Peter 2005. “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO‟s Dispute 
Resolution,” American Political Science Review 99(3):389-400. 
Rosendorff Peter and Helen Milner 2001. “The Optimal Design of International Trade 
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape,” International Organization 55(4):829-58. 
Roy Martin, Juan Marchetti and Hoe Lim 2007. “Services Liberalization in the New 
Generation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): How Much Further than the 
GATS?,” World Trade Review 6(2):155-92.   
Schropp Simon 2010. Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade 
Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shaffer Gregory and Mark Pollack 2010. “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and 
Antagonists in International Governance,” Minnesota Law Review 94:706-99. 
Slapin Jonathan and Sven-Oliver Proksch 2008. “A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-
Series Policy Positions from Texts,” American Journal of Political Science 52(3):705-22. 
Stephenson Sherry 2002. “Regional versus Multilateral Liberalization of Services,” World 
Trade Review 1(2):187-209. 
Stone Sweet Alec 1999. “Judicialization and the Construction of Governance,” Comparative 
Political Studies 32(2):147-84. 
Summers Lawrence 1991. “Regionalism and the World Trading System,” in Lawrence 
Summers (ed.), Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones, Kansas City: Federal 
Reserve Bank. 
Swank Duane 2006. “Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: An Assessment of a 
Conditional Diffusion Model of the Spread of Neoliberalism?,” International 
Organization 60(4):847-82. 
Teh Robert 2009. “Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements,” in Antoni 
Estevadeordal Kati Suominen and Robert Teh (eds.), Regional Rules in the Global 
Trading System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Teh Robert, Thomas Prusa and Michele Budetta 2009. “Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional 
Trade Agreements,” in Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen and Robert Teh (eds.), 
Regional Rules in the Global Trading System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
UN Social and Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2005-2010) “Trade 
Agreements Database,” http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/AllAgreementsGrid.aspx. 
Viner Jacob 1950. The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.  
Young Oran 1996. “Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives,” 
Global Governance 2(1):1-24.   
Zangl Bernhard 2008. “Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of Dispute Settlement under 
GATT and the WTO,” International Studies Quarterly 52(4):825-54. 
